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Introduction
The study of -technology transfer‖ has produced a rich and valuable literature, but the term -technology transfer‖ can also be somewhat misleading. Technology -transfer‖ puts the primary focus on the technology owners (or holders); the determinants of their strategies; and the impact of these on -access to technology‖ by the recipient country. We prefer instead to talk about -technology sourcing‖ strategies of technology-using companies and countries that involve search, absorption, learning, diffusion, as well as innovations-especially incremental innovations-that convert ideas, inventions, and discoveries into new products, services, processes, and business models.
We apply this framework to China's integrated circuit (IC) design industry and examine the role of global technology sourcing, its drivers and impacts. IC design is one of the priority targets of China's innovation policy, as codified especially in the SEI initiative. At the same time, however, China's IC design industry is deeply integrated into the vertically disintegrated global semiconductor industry, through markets, investment and technology. The study of global technology sourcing in China's IC design industry thus allows us to explore a fundamental challenge for China's innovation policy: To what degree is indigenous innovation compatible with globalization?
Specifically, the paper contributes to the literature in the following ways: First, we show that the process of global technology sourcing is changing in important ways as it becomes possible to -source‖ technological services in an increasingly fine division of the value chain, even compared to what was possible a few years ago. Second, the paper introduces a conceptual framework for analyzing the great variety of technology sourcing arrangements that characterize a highly globalized industry like IC design.
Third, the paper examines stages of chip design where global technology sourcing is likely to be critical for Chinese fabless IC design companies. Fourth, a distinction of different types of technology sourcing arrangements, such as licensing of inventions, contractual arrangements for training, knowledge sharing (e.g. the source code for IC design, software and system platforms), as well as the development of applications allows us to make some fresh observations about the nature of intellectual property protection, standardization, global technology sourcing, and the innovation process.
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The paper focuses on global technology sourcing in China's IC design industry for wireless communications. The paper proceeds from the general to the specific: we begin with global trends and conclude with a description of the business and technology strategies of three Chinese companies. Part One of the paper describes the broad patterns through which globalization has transformed the distribution of scientific and technical knowledge; explores possible effects on technology sourcing; and examines the tension between these global changes and China's indigenous innovation policy. Part Two introduces a framework for analyzing the industrial value chain of the semiconductor industry (with a focus on IC design), highlighting the role of providers of EDA tools, design IP building blocks, fab equipment, and materials, as well as foundry services and assembly and testing services.
Part Three identifies possible drivers of global technology sourcing. We focus on IC design for wireless communications, one of the most dynamic industries in the world, and arguably the most dynamic part of China's country's IC design industry. We examine how changes in markets and technology create new strategic opportunities for Chinese IC design companies. We then explore multiple challenges that Chinese IC design firms are facing when they attempt to upgrade and scale up their operations in order to penetrate new markets for higher-end products and processes. In Part Four, we describe diverse approaches to global technology sourcing by one Chinese smart phone vendor and two Chinese wireless IC design firms.
Part One -Globalization transforms technology sourcing and this has implications for China's innovation policy
Reflecting the globalization of markets and production, technology transfer increasingly cuts across national borders and links technology owners and users in countries that differ in their stage of development and in their economic institutions, and hence in their capacity to absorb and develop technology. International technology transfer has long been characterized by two basic facts: First, despite an increase in the geographic dispersion of R&D, scientific and technological knowledge remains highly concentrated. Second, the commercialization of technology typically imposes restrictions -legal and other -on the free communication of knowledge. which explicitly states that -experience shows that developed countries are unwilling to transfer core technologies to China.‖ Thus, indigenous innovation was promoted as a domestically controlled alternative for developing core technologies that are (asserted to be) unavailable on the international marketplace.
On the other hand, Chinese industry is deeply integrated into global industry. In 2011, foreign-invested enterprises produced 52.4% of China's exports. 44% of exports were produced under so-called -processing trade‖ arrangements, in which imported inputs are assembled into exports, which is an index of China's high degree of insertion into global production networks 2 . But China's integration goes far beyond this, since
Chinese industry is linked to multinational corporations by investment and cross-national research networks as well. Today, China is the largest ‗net importer' of R&D, and it is the third most important offshore R&D location for the 300 top R&D spending multinationals, after the United States and the United Kingdom. 3 As a result, the share of To explore these issues we need to describe in greater depth how globalization is changing technology sourcing in the IC design industry in general, and in IC design for wireless communications in particular. This paper is a first attempt to develop such a research agenda.
II. A Framework for Analyzing Technology Sourcing in the Semiconductor Value
Chain, with a Focus on IC design
This part describes the participants in the semiconductor value chain, and their specific role as technology holders and technology users. Together, these changes in markets and technology have created new strategic opportunities for Chinese IC design firms to upgrade their product portfolios, process technologies and business models. To utilize this potential, and to develop effective upgrading strategies will not be easy for Chinese firms, given their so far limited management and innovation capabilities.
The analysis reviews the current status of China's IC industry and discusses changes in markets and technology that are providing strategic opportunities for Chinese IC design companies to expand their role in mobile handsets and especially smart phones.
We then explore multiple challenges that Chinese IC design firms are facing when they attempt to upgrade and scale up their operations in order to penetrate new markets for higher-end products and processes.
We argue that, in order to cope with those ‗upgrading challenges', Chinese IC 
Strategic opportunities in the wireless communications market
Since the bursting of the Internet bubble at the turn of the century, wireless communications is an industry in turmoil, with tectonic shifts in markets and technology.
Here However, while mobile subscriber growth is fastest in Asia, revenue growth still remains focused on the US. In 2011, the US accounted for only six % of worldwide new mobile subscriptions. Yet, in the same year, the US reported 21% of the global service revenues, 26% of the mobile data revenues, and 27% of the global capital expenditures.
Despite the growing importance of Asian markets, the US market continues to matter, especially for the higher-end and more profitable market segments.
Of particular importance for IC design is that mobile devices are now exceeding to penetrate into China's thriving budget smart phone market. This has given rise to a renaissance of China's Shanzhai sector, but this time the focus is on incremental innovations in low-cost smart phones.
As a result, a local ecosystem for budget smart phones is emerging that links IC designers, OEMs and Chinese customers (see slide 13). The primary focus is on the China market, and but increasingly other Asian emerging economies are becoming important targets.
Upgrading Challenges and emerging strategies
Chinese At the same time, there is growing pressure to improve design productivity. A widening productivity gap between design and fabrication has been a primary driver behind these changes in design methodology. While the productivity of semiconductor fabrication has seen a 58% compounded annual growth since the 1980s, the productivity of chip design has lagged behind, with only a 21% compounded annual rate. There is also an important time dimension to this gap, as rapid technology change shortens productlife-cycles. Manufacturing cycle times are measured in weeks, with low uncertainty.
However, design and verification cycle times are measured in months or years, with high uncertainty. In the end, the design productivity gap reflects a growing mismatch between process and design technology --the number of available transistors has grown faster than the ability to design them meaningfully. Miniaturization has resulted in chips of nano-meter feature size -with the current best practice process technology moving below 20 22nm. As a result, it is now possible to fabricate millions of transistors on a single chip.
The resultant increase in design complexity must be matched by a dramatic improvement in design productivity, which requires significant changes in design methodology and organization.
Scaling It is most striking that the leading Chinese designers of ICs for handsets have responded to this opportunity with dramatically different business and technology strategies. Each of these business strategies depends on a particular approach to global technology sourcing, which in turn is tailored to that business strategy. 28 While the business strategies are very different, they imply that the companies will be in intensified competition with each other as the market for smart phones in China explodes; as lowcost smart phones hit the market; and as feature phones with smart-phone like features are developed. Differences in strategy, combined with a huge and rapidly growing market, may make it possible for many of these firms to thrive simultaneously by occupying slightly different market niches. However, the firms are very aware that they are coming into increasingly direct competition with each other, and that it is very likely that only a few of these companies will survive, and the others will be washed away by the force of competition.
A simplified breakdown of business strategies of three of the leading firms is as follows: RDA. RDA is following a strategy that is in some sense the most -traditional‖ late-comers catch-up strategy. RDA produces chips that are cheaper, and while not as advanced as the cutting-edge producers, they provide excellent features and functionality for price. Moreover, they are able to work with customers to provide a high level of integration among components and customized solutions. RDA has a large market share in China with inexpensive handset producers, including so-called shanzhai producers, and those that export inexpensive phones to developing Asia and Africa. RDA first established itself with a good quality, cheap Bluetooth chip, and developed capabilities from there. The formal acquisition of Coolsand in February 2012, completed the process of RDA developing its own baseband chips, which in turn enables them to offer packaged 29 Recall that in China, unlike in the US, phone carriers do not generally subsidize handset prices by bundling them with long-term service contracts. Most Chinese consumers are used to paying full price for handsets, meaning that a new model iPhone sells for about 5,000 RMB. At the current exchange rate of 6.3 RMB to the dollar, this means an iPhone sells for almost $800, while the Xiaomi was introduced at $317, and is now available for $238. They work closely with ED suppliers such as Synopsis. However, these are far from -turn-key‖ operations. RDA licenses blocks of IP and then encourages their engineers to invest substantial time and effort to understand that IP. Engineers are encouraged to prototype early, producing a chip which the company then debugs itself. Faster prototyping leads to quicker learning. The cost of sending tape-outs (prototypes) to the fab is considered good value for the rapid learning it produces. RDA is not dependent on global foundries, since it is currently designing at 60 nm (and has products using from 110 to 55 nm), so they are able to use a range of foundries, predominantly within China.
Discussion: RDA's strategy relies on access to cheap, well-trained engineering talent. These engineers have graduated from Chinese universities, and RDA willingly takes on the task of providing them with real-world experience. Through intensive use of domestic engineering talent, RDA engages in exceptionally rapid cycles of prototyping and new product development. This has allows rapid catch-up in capabilities and a sustained growth in market share at the low end of the end market.
Spreadtrum (zhanxun).
Spreadtrum is a rapidly-growing mid-size firm that has a large share of the TD-SCDMA market in China. Following a path initially blazed by Taiwan firm Mediatek, Spreadtrum aims to provide a turnkey platform that combines 30 From Wikipedia: -A baseband processor (BP) is a device (a chip or part of a chip) in a network interface that manages all the radio functions (all functions that require an antenna). This may not include wi-fi and/or bluetooth. It typically uses its own RAM and firmware. The rationale of separating the baseband processor from the main processor (known as the AP or Application Processor) is threefold: (1) radio control functions are highly timing dependant, and require a real time Operating System; (2) legal: some authorities require that the entire communications software stack be certified. Separating the BP into a different component allows reusing them without having to certify the full AP; (3) radio reliability: Separating the BP into a different component ensures proper radio operation while allowing application and OS changes. Baseband processors typically run a real time operating system written in firmware.
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baseband and RF (radio frequency) chips, along with all the relevant associated software solutions (including protocol stack, SW platform, and multimedia and internet interfaces).
Beginning as a low-cost copycat of Mediatek's comprehensive solutions for low-end feature phones, Spreadtrum has followed a remarkable process of technology leapfrogging, moving rapidly to implement near leading-edge process technology, which has enabled it to offer feature-rich phones and move rapidly into the smartphone era. A key milestone came in October 2010, when Spreadtrum engineers successfully prototyped a 2.5G integrated chip solution using 40 nm process technology, which provided the basis for a 95% increase in sales in 2011. The company is now planning for a transition to 28 nm process technology during 2012.
Global sourcing: Spreadtrum is a major user of global technology resources.
Spreadtrum has greater resources than RDA to spend in acquiring IP cores and design blocks from global suppliers such as Synopsis. The ability of Spreadtrum to efficiently access and utilize these resources is a key part of its success. Even more striking, though, in Spreadtrum's case, is the close cooperation with Taiwan Semiconductor (TSMC) which has enabled Spreadtrum to shrink the gap with the process technology global frontier. According to Spreadtrum's own account, TSMC prioritizes cooperation with two fablesss IC design companies in telecom, and these are Qualcomm and Spreadtrum.
TSMC cooperation is alleged by competitors to have been a key enabling factor in Spreadtrum's astonishing success in skipping a generation and successfully prototyping-on the first try-a 40 nm integrated solution (baseband +) in 2010.
Subsequently, this sustained relative advantage in process technology has given Spreadtrum the ability to move to new performance levels as it can producer smaller more efficient chips with a greater range of capabilities.
Discussion: Spreadtrum's strategy places it squarely in the center of the emerging Chinese market for smartphones, and particularly those based on TS-SCDMA, in which it is dominant. In current market conditions, Spreadtrum has been able to consolidate and expand its presence in a wide range of market segments, extending from mid-tier feature phones, through the new smart phone market, and up to current development of phones that will provide multi-mode functions in the future 4G LTE markets. During the second 26 half of 2012, Spreadtrum is ramping up sales of true 3G smartphone chips, and expects to sell 15-20 million.
Conclusions
This paper highlights a fundamental challenge for China's innovation strategy:
How can China reconcile its primary objective of strengthening indigenous innovation with the benefits that it could reap from its deep integration into international trade and into global networks of production and innovation?
As vertical specialization disintegrates the global semiconductor value chain, latecomers like China can now -source‖ technological knowledge and services from a growing variety of sources. We demonstrate that global technology sourcing is necessary for the success of the upgrading strategies of Chinese wireless IC design firms. We also highlight stages of IC design where global technology sourcing is of critical importance, and describe the great variety of technology sourcing arrangements that are emerging in this industry.
The paper explores how tectonic shifts in the global telecommunications industry provide new entry possibilities for Chinese IC design firms. An important finding is that disruptive changes in the global semiconductor value chain that started with seemingly small discrete steps can completely upset the existing competitive order. We show how entry barriers were driven down when Mediatek of Taiwan introduced inexpensive system-on-chip solutions, enabling China's whitebox (-Shanzhai‖) makers to penetrate into China's thriving budget smart phone market. This disruption is about to happen again, as China belatedly enters third generation (3G) mobile telecommunications, and prepares its foray into fourth generation (4G) technologies. The result is intensifying competition, with domestic and global players rushing to bring out new chips, and pushing the envelope on process technology. This process culminates in the development of new hybrid business models that rely heavily on global technology sourcing.
These findings have important policy implications. They support our argument, advanced a few years ago, that innovation in China progresses in areas that escape the attention of both pessimists (who emphasize China's weak innovation capacity) and
